Falkirk II - 1746

After a devastating victory at Prestonpans, the Jacobite army marched south into England. Upon their arrival, it became clear that the anticipated French invasion and the English Jacobite uprising was not going to materialize, so they retreated back into Scotland, fighting a rearguard action on Clifton Moor in Lancashire.

During this time, a siege of the government forces at Stirling Castle continued. A government army under Lt. General Hawley marched north and assembled at Edinburgh, then set off to the northwest to relieve Stirling. Lord George Murray’s Jacobite army blocked Hawley’s path at Falkirk, on 17 January 1746.

Murray took the initiative in the battle and deployed on commanding ground to the southwest of Falkirk, on Falkirk Muir, which the Jacobites approached from the west. The terrain was ideal for the Highland charge. Hawley responded by marching on to Falkirk Muir from the east, but he made the tactical error of not deploying his artillery before the start of battle.

Murray’s Jacobite army was made up of Highland clan forces, together with Lowland infantry and a small body of professional French troops. The Highlanders were placed in the front line and the Lowland infantry were set as support in the second line, together with a small cavalry reserve. The Jacobite’s Highland charge had been successful at Prestonpans, but that had been against troops that had never seen battle action. Here, the government army was made up of veteran troops, trained to form up in lines about 3 deep and to volley fire muskets at the rate of about 2 shots per minute. Hawley trusted this tactic would be effective against a Highland charge.

The first engagement was a left flank of government dragoons attack on the Jacobite right, but this failed and the fleeing dragoons disordered the government infantry regiments. As a result, the infantry were unable to reform their ranks in time to fire the intended volley before the Highlanders came in to actual hand-to-hand combat.

Under the pressure of the Highland charge, the government regiments broke, carrying the reserve militia with them. The Highlanders pressed on in pursuit. Rather than pressing a flank attack on the government right, the Highlanders simply raced after the government forces and pillaged their camp.

The regiments on the government right had not been disordered and they had the added protection of a steep ravine to prevent a Jacobite attack on the far right. This allowed them to hold their line against the Jacobite forces. The intense musket fire caused the Jacobite left to withdraw.

The day was coming to a close and the combination of the failing light and bad weather prevented a government offensive, even though many of the Jacobite forces were now disordered and were leaving the field of battle. As a result, Hawley retreated from the field and then withdrew back towards Edinburgh.

This battle was relatively short and left the Jacobites in command of the field, but the reality remains that whilst there was important value in the propaganda of the battle, the victory was actually hollow. The government forces did not see Falkirk as a defeat and the Jacobites had seen their own weaknesses exposed through ineffective command and control of the action, which failed to fully capitalize on the initial success.

This battle at Falkirk was the second of the Jacobite victories during the 1745-46 campaign. It was arguably the high point of the jacobite campaign, but it was not the devastating victory that could have been achieved. While it proved to be a propaganda success, in reality it revealed the great weaknesses of the Jacobite forces.